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V • 1 ------------- case 
Cert to C (Duniway, Burns; 
Kennedy, dissenting) 
o W.D. Wash. (Sharp; 
accepting magistrate's report) 
Federal/Civil (habeas) Timely 
the question of whether !~~ian Tribal 1 
Courts have jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with violating India 
YO!V QUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE 1. SUMMl~RY: This/raises 
tG -----. - - -law \vhile on Indian Reservations. 
-----------------~~ -
2. FACTS: The Suquamish Indian tribe has its reservation in 
1/ 
the state of Washington.- The tribe has enacted a tribal law and order 
~-z-1-o 
!/ Approximately o~-~f of the land within the reservation.is~ 
owned by non-Indians. The non-Indians pbpulation on the reservat1on 




code to regulate the conduct of persons with/its territorial jurisdiction. 
\
The code defines as offenses activities which would ordinarily be deemed 
petty offenses or misdemeanors. In accordance with the "Indian Bill 
of Rights", penalties for such offenses are limited to a maximum of 
six months imprisonment and/or a $500 fine. 25 u.s.c. § 1302. The 
tribe has also established a tribal court (with Indian judges and juries) 
to try alleged violations of the code. See 25 u.s.c. §§ 1301, 1311. 
(a) Oliphant: Petr Oliphant is a non-Indian residing on the 
Suquamish reservation. During the tribe's 1973 Chief Seattle Days 
celebration, Oliphant became involved in an altercation on the tribal 
encampment grounds, which are held in trust by the U.S. for the benefit 
of the tribe. When a tribal police officer attempted to halt the 
disturbance, petr assaulted him and was arrested for assaulting a police 
officer and resisting arrest, both violations of the tribal law and 
order code. Thereafter, he was arraigned on these charges in the triba l 
court, and bail was set in the amount of $100 for each charge. Since 
petr could not post bail, he was incarcerated for a period of five days. 
He was then released on his own recognizance. 
Following his release) petr sought habeas relief in the W.D. 
Wash. on the ground that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over non -
Indians. The dist ct disagreed and denied his petn for habeas. There-
after, he appealed to CA 9. 
(b) Belgrade: Petr Belgrade, also a non-Indian resident of the 
reservation, was arrested by tribal police on a state highway located 
within the reservation (unlike Oliph~t, the offense and arrest did not 
~-
take place on In ian trust property) for reckless driving and destruction 
of tribal property in violation of the tribal law and order code. Shortly 
- 3 -
thereafter, he was arraigned on these charges in the tribal court. After 
posting bond, he was released. 
Petr then also sought habeas relief in the W.D. Wash claiming that 
the tribe had no jurisdiction over him. That court saw no difference 
for jurisdictional purposes between the Indian trust property on which 
Oliphant's offense had occurredand the state highway running through 
the reservation. Hence, it denied relief on the basis of its earlier 
decision in Oliphant. Petr has filed a petn for cert directly from that 
ruling. 
3. HOLDING BELOW: In CA 9, Oliphant maintained that the Suquamish 
had no jurisdiction over non-Indians because Congress had never conferred 
such jurisdiction on them • . CA 9 rejected this contention. In its view, 
the proper inquiry was not whether Congress had conferred such jur isdic-
" tion on the tribe, but rather, since the tribes were once sovereign states, 
and as such, possessed the inherent power to preserve order by punishing 
those who violated their laws, whether Congress had limited that/ power. -
After reviewing the treaties Congress had made with the Suquamish and 
the statutes which affected the tribe, CA 9 concluded that Congress had 
not withdrawn that authority from it. In this regard, it noted: (a) 
that neither the Treaty of Point Elliot, (establishing the reservation) 
12 Stat. 927, nor the Treaty of 1905, (sale of certain tribal lands) 
33 Stat. 1078, mentioned the tribes power to try non-Indian criminals 
while treaties with other tribes had expressly granted or withdrawn that 
power; (b) that § 4 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, as amended, 
18 u.s.c. § 1152, while extending federal law to Indian Country, does 
not purport to either extinguish tribal jurisdiction or declare federal 
2/ 
jurisdiction exclusive; (c) that the congressional history of § 1152 
2/It distinguished Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353, relied on by 
petrs-and the dissent, on-the ground that the offense there involved was 
committed by a non-Indian while off Indian land. Hence, the tribe could no t 
have jurisdiction over him. See Elk v. \'vilkins, 112 U.S. 94 
- 4 -
supported the tribe's retention of jurisdiction over non-Indian; (d) 
that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 u.s.c. § 1302, really had no bearing 
3/ 
on the question;- and (e) that Public Law 280, as modified, 25 u.s.c. 
§ 1321, was equally irrelevant to the inquiry since Washington had cede d 
whatever jurisdiction it possessed over the tribe back to the U.S. in 
4/ 
1971.- In addition, it found that the sections of the tribal code here 
involved did not conflict with any federal law and that practical con-
siderations supported the existence of jurisdiction since without it, 
many petty violations by non-Indians would go unpunished. Hence, CA 9 
affirmed the dist ct's decision upholding the tribal court's jurisdiction 
over non-Indians for violatiornof Indian law committed on trust property. 
Judge Kennedy dissented. He could not agree with the majority's --------basic premise - that, in the absence of congressional action to the 
contrary, the tribe possessed the authority asserted here as an incident 
of its sovereignity. In this regard, he pointed out that a tribal court's 
criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian was a rather novel proposition; ,____.. -
the last federal court to pass on the question had done so in 1878 and 
had indicated, in dicta, that the tribal court had no such jurisdiction, 
Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878). Moreover, he noted 
that while many decisions of this Court spoke of tribal sovereignity, e.g. 
Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832), they had done so in the 
context of determining a state's jurisdiction over Indian lands where 
the federal gov't had decreed a measure of autonomy for the tribe (a 
preemption question), and not in the context of a tribe's attempt to 
~/The court rep jected pet:J claim that he could not receive a fair 
trial because only Indians would be on the jury as premature. 
4/In 1957, Wash. had assumed criminal jurisdiction over the tribe 
pursuant to § 7 of P.L. 280. 
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exercise jurisdiction over an individual. In his view, principles 
developed in the preemption context in order to protect the tribe from 
state encroachment had little application to the situation prese nted here 
because a tribe's power to prosecute non-members was not essential to its 
identity or its self-governing status. Hence, that the case turned on 
whether Congress intended tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-members. 
)/J ~~ .1 ~ "-,_J;;:~ / 
Turning to this inquiry, he concluded that Congress, while never 
explicitly saying so, did not intend the tribe to have such jurisdiction. 
His examination of early Indian statutes and treaties led him to believe 
that Congress had never recognized the Indians' inherent authority to 
punish non-Indians. Indeed, he pointed out that during treaty negotiations 
a number of tribes attempted to secure this power from Congress without 
success. In light of this background, he argued that the absence of any 
mention of this particular issue in the statutes and treaties relied on 
by the majority was not surprising. In addition, he points out numerous 
references in the legislative history of a number of Indian statutes (as 
late as 1970) which suggest that the tribes possess no jurisdiction 
over non-members. Finally, he notes that Congress has consistently 
evidenced an intent to treat offenses by Indians against each other diffe r-
ently from those involving non-Indians and that this distinction is re-
fleeted in/current federal scheme for dealing with offenses on Indian land 
which exempts purely "Indian" offenses from the operation of federal law 
unless they fall with the "Major Crimes Act". See 18 u.s.c. § 1152 and 
§ 1153. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petrs reiterate their claim that the tribal 
~. court lacks jurisdiction over them. Unfortunately, their attorney has 
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not done a very good job of presenting their case. At the outset, he 
maintains that the conc e pt of tribal sovereignity relied on by the 
majority is somehow unconstitutional. For the most part, however, he 
argues that whatever sovereignity the tribe originally possessed in this 
regard has been extinguished over time by ·the numerous congressional en-
actments which have extended both state and federal criminal jurisdiction 
over tribal lands. This claim was rejected by CA 9 which noted that the 
statutes relied on did not speak to the precise question presented here 
and thus did not extinguish the tribe's concurrent jurisdiction over 
offenses. In addition, he claims that Washington's retrocession of 
jurisdiction back to the U.S. was ineffective as a matter of state law. 
Throughbub~: he emphasizes the novelity of the question. 
The tribe has filed a response. As might be expected, it argues 
}that the major premise of the CA 9 majority is correct; that this Court 
l has always recognized a tribe's sovereignity in the absence of contrary 
congressional action, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217; U.S. v. Mazurie, 
419 U.S. 544; that Congress has never expressly withdrawn the tribe's 
jurisdiction over petr's offenses; and that the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the tribe is consistent with Congress• policy of tribal self-govern-
ment. In addition, it argues that there is no reason for the Court to 
review the Belgrade case before the 9th Circuit has had an opportunity 
to do so since the case is distinguishable from Oliphant's and it is 
not certain that CA 9 will find that decision controlling. 
Amicus briefs have been filed by Kitsap County, Wash. (the 
county in which the reservation is located) and the Wash. AG. The former 
supports the petn for cert; it points out that the vast majority of the 
reservation's population are non-Indians (150 Indians; approximately 3000 
- 7 -
non-Indians) and merely objects to the Indians attempt to exercise 
jurisdiction over the majority. The latter supports the tribe; the 
only interesting point it raises is a suggestion that a tribal court's 
exercise of jurisdiction over a non-Indian is not as novel as the dissent 
suggests. However, it offers no figures to support this assertion. 
5. DISCUSSION: .The issue presented by this case is one of first 
impression in this Court. Moreover, it would seem to be one of increasing 
importance as tribal gov't's become more and more active. 
On the merits, depending on one's initial premise, both the CA 9 
\/\~majority and dissent offer rather persuasive arguments in support of 
- J their position. On the question of tribal sovereignity, the majority is 
correct in pointing out that this Court has often spoken of the Indian 
tribes as soverign nations, who though conquered and dependent, retain 
those powers of autonomous states that are neither inconsistent with 
their status nor expressly terminated by Congress. Worcester, supra. 
On the other hand, the dissent is correct in noting that those decisions 
arose in a distinguishable context and that history would seem to suggest 
that the tribes possessed no jurisdiction over non-Indians. Any analysis 
of the question is further complicated by the fact that congressional 
policy toward the Indians has not remained consistent throughout history. 
c :mtral 
Since congressional intent and federal Indian policy are/to the theories 
of both the majority and dissent, the SG would seem to be an appropriate 
party to call upon. 
Finally, with respect to Belgrade, there would appear to be no 
reason to deviate from the normal appellate process as the resp tribe 
suggests. 
There is a response. 
2/10/77 
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From: L.F.P., Jr. 
Since we talked about the above case, I have spent about 
three hours on the rather elaborate briefs. This is not enough 
study to justify even a tentative conclusion as to whether the 
question of jurisdiction is settled under the relevant treaties, 
statutes, and court decisions, but I now do have some "feel" for 
the case. The purpose of this brief note to you is to make 
several general observations. 
The case is one of considerable i.mportance, perhaps more 
to the states in which Indian reservations continue to exist than 
to Indian tribes such as the Suquamish Tribe. It is surprising 
that the question, as noted in the SG's brief, is one of first 
impression - addressed in the past only by a dictum in one early 
federal case. SG's brief p. 8. 
The SG's brief also conveys the impression that the 





the arguably relevant federal treaties and statutes. The SG 
supports its argument in favor of jurisdiction by the "main 
thrust of federal policy" in recent years. The SG makes two 
specific submissions: (i) that the Treaty of Point Elliott 
should be read as reserving exclusive criminal jurisdiction to 
the tribe for offenses not covered by the Major Crimes Act or the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, and (ii) that the most relevant federal 
statute - 18 u.s.c. 1152 (the 1854 statute extending federal 
criminal laws to "Indian Country") may be construed as imposing a 
_9QnC~f!~nt federal jurisdiction in cases like these. Thus, I 
read the SG's brief as relying in major part on a perception of 
recent federal policy to accord increased recognition to tribal 
authority. 
If this case is to turn on policy considerations, rather 
than some firm conclusion drawn from reJ.evant federal law, I 
would be inclined to weigh heavily the policy arguments in favor 
of the states. Here, I commend the amicus brief filed by the 
State of Washington, the state most directly affected by this 
case. Moreover, the washington State Attorney General (Slade 
Gorton) has proved - in perhaps half a dozen cases - to be among 
the ablest and fairest of the state attorney generals who has 
argued before us. His description of the Port Madison Indian 
Reservation reminds me of the analogous condition of the Puyallup 
Reservation (said to be typical of many reservations in the 
West). Here, the reservation consists of 7,275 acreas, of which 
63% is privately owned fee simple (apparently by non-Indians) 1 
3. 
36% remains in allotment status with the patent held in trust by 
the United States: and only about 1% is tribally owned. Of a 
total population of 2,928 on the reservation, not more than 150 
(the briefs vary between 50 and 150) are members of the Suquamish 
Tribe. The State of washington has exercised criminal 
jurisdiction over the non-Indians on this and similar 
reservations, and apparently (according to respondent's brief) 
the tribal courts only recently have resumed the exercise of 
asserted jurisdiction. The state exercises full jurisdiction 
over tribal members for compulsory school attendance, public 
welfare, mental illness, juvenile delinquency, the building, 
construction and policing of streets and highways, etc. 
In terms of policy considerations, it makes no sense to 
allow 50 to J50 Indians to set up a "trjbal court" and assume 
jurisdiction - whether concurrent or not - over more than 2,800 
non-Indians who live within the technical boundary of the 
reservation, and who own in fee most of the land. 
I realize that Indian law is indeed "a Jaw unto itself", 
and often seems incompatible with broader pubJic interests. I am 
inclined to accept a large measure of autonomy where the issue 
involves the preservation of tribal history, culture and the 
rights of Indians. But this case involves the attempt by a 
handful of Indians to exercise crjminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in a manner., and for purposes, unrelated to the 
preservat5on of tribal integrity. 
4. 
Thus, as you will see, I am inclined - on the basis of 
my understanding of the case at this time - strongly to favor 
reversaJ. Yet, I have not attempted to thread my way through the 
labyrinth of treaty, statute and case Jaw that may be reJevant. 
I hope it will not be necessary for you to write a bench memo in 
proportion to the outrageously long briefs for petitioners. My 
own tentative impression is that the federal statutes fairly can 
be construed to deny jurisdiction. My guess is that, as the 
Attorney General of washington argues, the fundamental error of 
CA 9 was in viewing "tribal sovereignty" as a geographic concept 
rather than a personal concept. See amicus brief, pp. 6, 17 et 
seq. 
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Two hundred years a.go, the area bordering Puget Sound 
consisted of a. large number of politically autonomous Indian 
villages, each occupied by from a. few dozen to over a. hundred u ____ . _ / 
Indians. Through a series of treaties in the mid-19th century, Gt- r ~
these loosely related villages were aggregated into a series of~
Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has become the . _,I~ _ . .J._ 
focal point of this litigation. By the 1855 Treaty of Point .......,.-~ • 
Elliott, 12 Stat. 927, the Suquamish Indian Tribe relinquished 
all rights that they might have had in the lands of the State 
of Washington and agreed to settle on a 7,276-acre reservation 
near Port Madison, Wash. Located on Puget Sound across 
from the city of Seattle, the Port Madison Reservation is a 
checkerboard of tribal community land, allotted Indian lands, 
property held in fee-simple by non-Indians, and various roads 
and public highways maintained by Kitsap County.1 
1 According to the District Court's findings of fact, the "Port Madison 
Indian Reservation consists of approximately 7,276 acres of which approxi-
mately 63% thereof is owned in fee-simple absolute by non-Indians and 
the remaining 37% i:s Indian owned lands subject to the trust ~tatus of the 
United States, consisting mostly of unimproved acreage upon which no 
persons reside. Residing on the reservation is an estimated population of 
approximately 2,928 non-Indians living in 976 dwelling units. There lives 
on the reservation approximately 50 members of the Suquamish Indian 
Tribe. Within the re~rvtttion are numerous public highways of the State 
76-5729-0PINION 
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The Suquamish Indians are governed by a tribal government 
which in 1973 adopted a Law and Order Code. The Code, 
which covers a variety of offenses from theft to rape, purports 
to extend the Tribe's criminal jurisdiction over both Indians 
and non-Indians.~ Proceedings are held in the Suquamish 
Indian ProvisionaJ Court. Pursuant to the lndian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. 25 U. S. C. ~ 1302. defendants are entitled 
to many of the due process protections accorded to defendants 
in federal or state criminal proceedings. However, the guar-
antees are not identical. Non-Indians. for example, are 
excluded from Suquamish tribal court juries." 
of Washington, public schools, public utilities and other facilities in which 
neithrr the Suquamish Indian Tribe nor the United States has any owner-
ship or inter('st." 
The Suquamish Indian Tribr, unlike many other Indian tribes, did not 
consent to non-Indian homrsteading of unallott.ed or "surplus" lands within 
their resrrvation purmant. t9 25 U. S. C. § 348 and 43 U. S. C. §§ 1195-
1197. Instead, the substantial non-Indian population on the Port Madison 
Reservation it:~ primarily thr result. of the sale of Indian allotments to 
non-Indians by the Secretary of thr Interior. Congressional legislation has 
allowed such sales where the allotments were in heirship, fell to " incom-
petrnts," or wrre surrendered in lieu of other selections. The substantial 
non-Indian::; land-holdings on the Reservation is also a result of the lifting 
of various trust restrictions which has enabled individual Indians to sell 
their allotments. See 25 U. S. C.§§ 349 and 392. 
·z Notiers werr placrd in prominent. places at the entrances to t he Port 
Mildison Reservation informing the public that ent ry onto the re::;ervation 
would be d€'emed implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the 
Suquamish tribal court. 
3 ln Talttm v. Mayes , 163 U. S. 37() (1896) , this Court held that. the 
Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal 
governments. Through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Congress 
extended many due process guarantees to defendants before Indian tribal 
courts, but the guarantees are not identical tD those set out in the Federal 
Constitution. Thus, the Act provides for "a trial by jury of not less than 
six persons," 25 U. S. C. § 1302 (10) , but the tribal court. is not prohibited 
from excluding non-Indians from the jury even where a non-Indian is being 
tried. In 1976,, th() Suquamish Trioe amended its Law and Order Code to 
. \ 
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Both petitioners are non-Indian residents of the Port 
Madison Reservation. Petitioner Mark David Oliphant was 
arrested by tribal authorities during the Suquamish's annual 
Chief Seattle Days celebration and charged with assaulting a 
tribal officer and resisting arrest. After arraignment before 
the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his own recognizance. 
Petitioner Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested by tribal authori-
ties after an alleged high-speed race along the reservation 
highways that only ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal 
police vehicle. Belgarde posted bail and was released. Six 
days later he was arraigned and charged under the tribal code 
with "recklessly endangering another person" and injuring 
tribal property. Tribal court proceedings against both peti-
tioners have been stayed pending a decision in this case. 
Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Washington. Petitioners argued that the Suquamish Indian 
Provisional Court does not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. In separa.te proceedings, the District Court dis-
agreed with petitioners' argument and denied the petitions. 
On August 5, 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the denial of habeas corpus in the case of petitiouer 
Oliphant. 544 F. 2d 1007. Petitioner Belgarde's appeal is 
still pending before the Court of Appeals. We granted cer-
tiorari, 431 U. S. 964, to decide whether Indian tribal courts 
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that 
they do not. 
I 
Respondents do not contend that their exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians stems from affirmative congres-
sional authorization or treaty provision.4 Instead, respondents 
provide that only Suquamish Tribal members shall ·erve as juror::; in tribal 
court. 
~Respondents do contend that Congress has "confirmed" thr power of 
Indian tribes to try and punish non-Indians through the Indian Reorgani-
76-5729-0PINION 
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urge that such jurisdiction flows automatically from the 
"Tribe's retained inherent powers of government over the Port 
Madison Indian Reservation." Seizing on language in our 
opinions describing Indian tribes as "quasi-sovereign entities," 
see, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 552 (1974), the 
Court of Appeals agreed and held that Indian tribes, "though 
conquered and dependent, retain those powers of autonomous 
states that are neither inconsistent with their status nor 
expressly terminated by Congress." According to the Court 
of Appeals, criminal jurisdiction over anyone committing an 
offense on the reservation is a "sine qua non" of such powers. 
The Suquamish Indian Tribe does not stand alone today in 
its assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Of 
the 127 reservation court systems that currently exercise 
criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to extend 
zation Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 476, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 
1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1302. Neither Act, however, addre~ses, let alone 
"confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Indian 
Reorganization Act merely gives each Indian tribe the right "to organize 
for its common welfare" and to "adopt an appropriate constitution and 
bylaws." With certain specific additions not relevant here, the tribal 
council is to have such power::; as are vested "by existing law." The Indian 
Civil Rights Act merely extends to "any person" within the tribe's 
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the 
Federal Constitution. 
As respondents note, an early version of the Indian Civil Rights Act 
extended its guarantees only to "American Indians," rather than to "any 
person." The purpose of the later modification was to extend the Act's 
guarantees to "all persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal 
governments, whether Indians or non-Indians." Summary Report on the· 
Constitutional Rights of American Indians, Subcomm. on Const. Rights 
of the Senate Judiciary Corum., 89th Cong., 2d S!'S«., at 10 (1966). But 
this change was certainly not intended to giv<' Indian tribes criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Nor can it be read to "confirm" respond-
ents' argument that Indian tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. Instead , the modification merely demonstrates Congress' 
desire to extend the Act's guarantees to non-Indian::; if and where they 
come under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction by either treaty provision. 
qr act of Con~ress. 
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that jurisdiction to non-Indians.5 Twelve other Indian tribes 
have enacted ordinances which would permit the assumption 
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Like the Suquam-
ish these tribes claim authority to try non-Indians not on the 
basis of congressional statute or treaty provision but by reason 
of their retained national sovereignty. 
The effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, is a relatively new 
phenomenon. And where the effort has been made in the 
past, it has been held that the jurisdiction did not exist. Until 
the middle of this century, few Indian tribes maintained any 
:semblance to a formal court system. Offenses by one Indian 
against another were usually handled by social and religious 
pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was 
on restitution rather than on punishment. In 1834 the Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs described the then status of Indian 
criminal systems: "With the exception of two or three tribes, 
who have within a few years past attempted to establish some 
few laws and regulations amongst themselves, the Indian 
tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much authority 
to exercise any restraint." H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 
1st Sess., at 91 (1834). 
It is therefore not surprising to find no specific discussion of 
the problem before us in the volumes of United States Reports. 
But the problem did not lie entirely dormant for two centuries. 
5 Of the 127 courts currently operating on Indian reservations, 71 
(including the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court) are tribal courts, 
establi~hed and functioning pursuant t.o tribal legislative powers; 30 are 
"CFR Courts'' operating under the Code of Federal Regulations, 25 CFR 
§ 11 (1977); 16 are traditional courts of the New Mexico pueblos; and 10 
a.re ron~ervation courts. The CFR Courts are the offspring to the Courts 
of Indian Offenses, first provided for in the Indian Department Appropria-
tions Aet of 1888, 25 Stat. 217, 233. See W. Hagan, Indian Police a.nd 
Judgf's ( Hl66). By l'egula tions issued in 1935, the jurisdiction of CFR 
Courts is restricted to offenses committed by Indians wit.hin the reservation. 
25 CFR § 11 .2 (a) ( 1977). The case before us is concerned only with the: 
t:rhninal jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
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A few tribes during the 19th century did have formal criminal 
systems. From the earliest treaties with these tribes, it was 
apparently presumed that the tribes did not have criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or 
treaty provision to that effect. For example, the 1830 Treaty 
with the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which had one of the most 
sophisticated of tribal structures, guaranteed to the tribe "the 
jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property 
that may be within their limits." Despite the broad terms of 
this governmental guarantee, however, the Choctaws at the 
conclusion of this treaty provision "express a wish that Con-
gress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by 
their own laws any white man who shall come into their nation, 
and infringe any of their national regulations." 6 Such a 
6 The history of Indian treaties in the United States is consistent with 
the principle that Indian tribes may not assume criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians without the permission of Congrf'ss. The earliest treaties 
typically expressly provided that "any citizen of the United States, who 
shaiJ do an injury to any Indian of the [tribal] nation, or to any other 
Indian or Indians residing in their towns, and under their protection, shall 
be punished according to the laws of the United States." Sec, e. g .. Treaty 
with the Shawnee, Art. III, 7 Stat. 26 (1786). While, as elaborated 
further below, these provi~ions were not necessary to rf'move criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians from thE' Indian tribes, they would naturally 
have served an important function in the developing stage of United 
States-Indian relations by clarifying jurisdictional limits to the Indian 
tribes. The same treaties generalJy provided that "[i]f any citizen of the 
United States .. . shall settle on any of the lands hereby allotted to the 
Indians to live and hunt on, such person shall forfeit the protection of the 
United States of America, and the Indians may punish him or not as they 
please." See, e. g., Treaty with the Choctaw, Art. IV, 7 Stat . 21 (1786). 
Far from representing a recognition of any inherent Indian criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians settling on tribal lands, these provisions were 
instead intended as a means of discouraging non-Indian settlements on 
Indian territory, in cont.ravention of treaty provisions to the contrary. 
See 5 Annals of Congress 903-904 (April 9, 1796). Later trf'aties dropped 
this provision and provided instead that non-Indian settlers would be 
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request for affirmative congressional authority is inconsistent 
with respondents' belief that criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians is inherent in tribal sovereignty. Faced by attempts 
removed by the United States upon complaint being lodged by the tribe. 
See, e. g., Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes, 7 Stat. 84 ( 1804). . 
As the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States 
developed through the passage of time, specific provisions for the punish-
ment of non-Indians by the United States, rather than by the tribes, :;]owly 
disappeared from the tveaties. Thus, for example, none of the treaties 
signed by Washington Indians in the 1850's explicitly proscribed criminal 
prosecution and punishment of non-Indians by the Indian tribes. As 
discussed below, however, several of the t.r~>aty provisions can be read as 
recognizing that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in the 
United States rather than in the tribes. The disappearance of provisions 
explicitly providing for the punishment of non-Indians by the United 
States, rather than by the Indian tribes, coincides with and is at least 
partly explained by the extension of federal enclave la.w over non-Indians 
in the Trade and Intercourse Acts and the general recognition by Attorneys 
General and lower federal courts tha.t Indians did not have jurisdiction 
to try non-Indians. See infra, at. S-,.10. When it was felt. neoessary to 
expressly spell out respective jurisdictions, later treaties still provided that 
criminal jurisdiction oyer non-Indians would be in the United States. See, 
e. g., Treaty with the Utah-Tabequache Band, Art. 6, 13 Stat. 673 (1863). 
Only one treaty signed by the United States has ever provided for any 
form of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (other than in the 
illegal settler context noted above). The first treaty signed by the United 
Sta.tes with an Indian tribe, the 1778 Treaty with the Delawares, provided 
that neither party to the treaty could "proceed to the infliction of punish-
ments on the citizens of the other, otherwise than by securing the o.ffender 
or offenders by imprisonment, or any other competent means, till a fair 
and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near 
as can be to the laws, customs and usages of the contracting parties and 
natural justice: The mode of such tria'ls to be hereafter fixed by the wise 
rnen of the United States in Congress assembled, with the assistance 
of ... deputies of the Delaware nation .... " Treaty with the Dela-
wn,res, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 13 (1778) (emphasis added). While providing for 
Delaware participation in the trial of non-Indians, this treat.y iiectim~ 
established that non-Indians could only be tried under thP auspices of the 
U~1itea States and in a manner fixed by the Continental Congres~. 
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of the Choctaw Tribe to try non-Indian offenders in the early~ 
1800's the Un.ited States Attorneys General also concluded 
that the Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians absent congressional authority. See 2 Opinions of 
the Attorney General 693 ( 1834) ; 7 Opinions of the Attorney 
General 174 ( 1855). According to the Attorney General in 
1834, tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inter alia 
inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty 
of the United States over the territory assigned to the Indian 
nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States. 
At least one court has previously considered the power of 
Indian courts to try non-Indians and it also held against 
jurisdiction.7 In Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cases 353 (WD 
Ark. 1878), Judge Isaac C. Parker, who as District Court Judge 
for the Western District of Arkansas was constantly exposed 
to the legal relationships between Indians and non-Indians, 8 
7 According to Felix Cohen's Handbook of Ji'ederallndian Law, "attempts 
of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians ... have been generally 
condemned by the £ederal courts since the end of the treaty-making period, 
and the writ of habeas corpus has been used to discharge white defendants 
from tribal custody." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 148 
(United States Dept. of the Interior 1942). 
8 Judge Parker sat as the judgr of t.he United States District Court. for 
the Western District of Arkansas from 1875 until 1896. By rea:;on of the 
laws of Congress in effect at the time, that particular court handled not 
only the normal docket of ~ederal casrs arising in the We:;tern District of 
Arkansas, but also had criminal jurisdiction over what wa:; then called the 
"Indian Territory." This area varird in sizE' during Parker's tenure; at 
one time it extended as far wes1 as thr •ea;;tern border of Colorado, and 
always included substantial part:,; of what. would later become the State· 
of Oklahoma. In the exercise of this juri:;dict.ion over the Indian Territory, 
the Court in which he sat was nece:;sarily in constant contact with 
individual Indians, the tribes of which they were members, and the white· 
men who dealt with them and often preyed upon them . 
. Judge Parker's views of the law were not always upheld by this Court... 
See II Wigmore on Evidence § 276, at 115--116, n. 3 (3d ed. 1940). A 
1:eacj.in~ of Wigmore, however, indicates that he was as critical of the· 
76-5729-0PINION 
OLIPHANT v. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE !) 
held that to give an Indian tribal "court jurisdiction of the 
person of an offender, such offender must be an Indian." !d., 
at 355. The conclusion of Judge Parker was reaffirmed only 
recently in a 1970 Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department 
of the Interior. See 77 I. D. 113 (1970).9 
While Congress was concerned almost from its beginning 
with the special problems of law enforcement on the Indian 
reservations, it did not initially address itself tp the problem 
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the reasons pre-
viously stated, there was little reason to be concerned with 
assertions of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians because 
of the absence of formal tribal judicia] systems. Instead, 
Congress' concern was with providing effective protection for 
the Indians "from the violence of the lawless part of our 
frontier inhabitants." Seventh Aqrrual Address of President 
George Washington, I Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 
1789-1797, at 181, 185 (1897, J. Richardson, ed.). Without 
deci~ions of this Court there mentioned as this Court was of the evidentiary 
rulings of Judge Parker. Nothing in these long forgotten disputes detracts 
from the universal esteem in which the Indian tribes which were subject to 
the jurisdiction of his court held .Judge Parker. One of his biographers, 
describing the judge's funeral, states that after the grave was filled "[t]he 
principal chief of the Choctaws, Plea:sant Porter, came forward and placed 
a wreath of wild flowers on the grave." H. Croy, He Hanged Them 
High (1952). 
It may be that .Judge Parker's views as to the ultimate destiny of the 
Indian people are not in accord with current thinking on the subject, but 
we have observed in mol'e than one of our cases that the views of the 
people on this issue as reflected in the judgments of Congress itself have 
changed from one era to the next. See Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 
71-74 (1962). There cannot be the :slightest doubt that .Judge Parker 
was, by his own lights and by the lights of the time in which he lived, a 
judge who was thoroughly acquainted with and sympathetic to the 
Indians a.nd Indian tribes which were subject to the jurisdiction of his 
court, as well as familinr with the law which governed them. See 
generally Hell on the Border (1971, .J . G11egory & R. Strickland, eds.) 
9 The 1970 Opinion of the Solicitor was withdrawn in 1974 but has not 
been repla.ced. No reason was given for the withdrawal. 
''· 
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such protection, it was felt that "all the exertions of the 
Government to prevent destructive retaliations by the Indians 
will prove fruitless and all our present agreeable prospects 
illusory." !Oid. Beginning with the Trade and Intercourse 
Act of 1790. 1 Stat. 137, therefore, Congress assumed federal 
jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against Indians 
"which would be punishable in the state or district if com-
mitted against a White." In 1817, Congress went one step 
further and extended federal enclave law to the Indian 
Country; the only exception was for "any offense committed 
by one Indian against another." 3 Stat. 383, as amended, 18 
U. S. C. § 1152. 
It was in the same year that Congress was first directly 
faced with the prospect of Indians trying non-Indians. In the 
Western Territory Bill/° Congress proposed to create an 
Indian territory beyond the western-directed destination of 
the settlers; the territory was to be governed by a confedera-
tion of Indian tribes and was expected ultimately to become 
a State of the Union. In creating by legislation a political 
territory with broad governing powers, Congress was careful 
not to give the tribes of the territory criminal jurisdiction over 
United States officials and citizens traveling through the 
area.11 The reasons were quite practical: 
"Officers, and persons in the service of the United 
States, and persons required to reside in the Indian coun-
10 See H . R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., l f't Se:;s., at 36 (1834) . 
11 The We,;t.ern Territory Bill, like the early Indian treati r~. ;.;re n . 6, 
sur>ra. did not extend the prot ection of 1he United State,; to non-Indians 
who Sl'ttll'd without Government bu:;ine~s in Indian territory . Sr r Western 
Territory Bill, § 6, in H . R . Rep . No. 474, 2:~d Cong., 1st Se:><>., at 35 ; 
id., at 18. This exception, like that in the early trea ties, wm; pre::;umably 
meant to discourage settlement on land that was reserved exclusively for 
the UAe of the variom; Indian tribes. Today, man~· reserva tions, including-
the Port Madison Reservation, have extensive non-Indian populations. 
The pl.'rcentage of non-Indian ref'ident~ grew as a direct and intended 
:cesult Qf congressional l)olicics i1,1 the late 19th and ea rly 20th centuries 
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try by treaty stipulation, must necessarily be placed under 
the protection, and subject to the laws of the United 
Sta.tes. To persons merely travelling in the Indi!ln coun-
try the same protection is extended. The want of fixed 
laws, of competent tribunals of justice, which must for 
some time continue in the Indian country, absolutely 
requires for the peace of both sides that this protection be 
extended." H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., at 
18 (1834). 
Congress' concern over criminal jurisdiction in this proposed 
Indian Territory contrasts markedly with its tota.l failure to 
address criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on other reser-
vations, which frequently bordered non-India.n settlements. 
The contrast suggests that Congress shared the view of the 
Executive Branch and lower federal courts that Indian tribal 
courts were without jurisdiction to try non-Indians. 
This unspoken assumption was also evident in other con-
gressional actions during the 19th century. In 1854, for 
ex~tmple, Congress amended the Trade and Intercourse Act to 
proscribe the prosecution in federal court of an Indian who has 
already been tried in tribal court. 10 Stat. 270, as amended, 
18 U. S. C. § 1152. No s1mila.r provision, such as would have 
been required by parallel logic if tribal courts had jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, was enacted barring retrial of non-Indians. 
Similarly, in the Major Crimes Act of 1885, Congress placed 
under the jurisdiction of federal courts India.n offenders who 
promoting the assimilation of the Indians into the non-Indian culture. 
Respondents point to no statute, in comparison to the Western Territory 
Bill, where Congress has intended to give Indian tribes jurisdiction today 
over nOli-Indians residing within reservations. 
Even as drafted, many Congressmen felt that the Bill was too radical 
a. shift in United States-Indian relations :mel the Bill was tabled. See 10 
Register of Cong. Debates 4779 (June 25, 1834) . While the Western 
Territory Bill was resubmitted ~everal times in revised form, it was never 
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commit certain specified major offenses. 25 Sta.t. 385, as 
amended. 18 U. S. C. § 1153. If tribal courts may try non-
Indians, however, as respondents contend, those tribal courts 
are free to try non-Indians even for such major offenses as 
Congress may well have given the federal courts exclusive 
jurisdiction to try members of their own tribe committing the 
exact same offenses.12 
In 1891, this Court recognized that Congress' various actions 
and inactions in regulating criminal jurisdiction on Indian 
reservations demonstrated an intent to reserve jurisdiction 
over non-Indians for the federal courts. Iu In re Mayfield, 
141 U.S. 107, 115-116 (1891), the Court noted that the policy 
of Congress had been to allow the inhabita.nts of the Indian 
country "such power of self-government as was thought to be 
12 The Major Crimes Act provides that Indians committing any of the 
enumerated offenses "shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all 
other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States." While the question has never been 
directly addressed by this Court, courts of appeals have read this language· 
to 'exclude tribal jurisdiction over the Indian offender. Sec, e. g., Sam v. 
United States, 385 F. 2d 213, 214 (CAlO 1967); Felicia v. United States, 
495 F. 2d 353, 354 (CA8 1974). 
The legislative history of the original version of the Major Crimes Act, 
which was introduced as a House amendment to the Indian Appropriation 
Bill of 1854, creates some confusion on the question of exclusive jurisdic-
tion. As originally worded, the amendment would have provided for trial 
in the United States courts "and not otherwise." Apparently at the 
suggestion of Congressman Budd, who believed that concurrent juri;:;diction 
in the courts of the United Stateo was sufficient, the words "and not 
otherwise" were deleted when the amendment was later reintroduced. See 
16 Cong. Rec. 934-935 (Jan. 22, 1885). However, as finally accepted by 
the Senate and passed by both Houses, the amendment did provide that the 
Indian offender would be punished as any other offender, "within the · 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." The issue of exclusive juris-
diction over major crimes was mooted for all practical purposes by the 
passage of the Indian Civil Right::; Act of 1968 which limits the punishment 
that can be impo~:>cd by Indian tribal courts to a term of 6 months or a 
fi.pe of $500. 
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-consistent with the safety of the White population with which 
they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as far 
.-as possible in raising themselves to our standard of civiliza-
tion." The "general object" of the congressional statutes was 
to allow Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all contro-
versies between India.ns, or where a member of the nation is 
the only party to the proceeding, and to reserve to the courts 
of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to which its own 
citizens are parties on either side." Ibid. While Congress 
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal pen-
alties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit 
conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently 
believed this to be the necessa.ry result of its repeated legisla-
tive actions. 
In a 1960 Senate Report, tha.t body expressly confirmed its 
assumption that Indian tribal courts are without inherent 
jurisdiction to try non-lndia.ns, and must depend on the 
Federal Government for protection from intruders.1 " In con-
sidering a statute that would prohibit unauthorized entry 
upon Indian land for the purpose of hunting or fishing, the 
Senate Report noted that 
"The problem confronting Indian tribes with sizable 
reservations is that the United States provides no protec-
13 In 1977, a Congressional Policy Review Commission, citing the lower 
court decisions in Oliphant and Belgarde, concluded that. "[t.]here is an 
established legal basis for tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians." 
1 Final Report of tile American Indian Policy Review Commission 114, 
117, and 152-154 (1977). However, the Commission's Report does not 
deny that for almost two hundred years before the lower courts decided 
Oliphant and Belgarde, the three branch of the Federal Government were 
in apparent agreement that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over 
non-Indians. As the Vice-Chainnan of the Commission noted in dissent, 
"such general jurisdiction has generally not been asserted and ... the 
lack of legislation on this point reflects a congressional assumption that 
there was no such tribal jurisdiction." Id., at 587 (di~senting views of 
Cong. Lloyd Meeds). 
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tion against trespassers comparable to the protection it 
gives to Federal property as exemplified by title 18, United 
States Code, section 1863 [trespass on national forest 
lands]. Indian property owners should have the same 
protection as other property owners. For example, a 
private hunting club may keep nonmembers off its game 
lands or it may issue a permit for a fee. One who comes 
on such lands without permission may be prosecuted 
under State law but a non-Indian trespasser on an 
Indian reservation enjoys immunity. This is by reason 
of the fact that Indian tribal law is enforcible aga.inst 
Indians only; not against non-Indians. 
"Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian 
courts and cannot be tried in Indian courts on trespass 
charges. Further, there are no Federal laws which can be 
invoked against trespassers. 
"The committee has considered this bill and believes 
that the legislation is meritorious. The legislation will 
give to the Indian tribes and to individual Indian owners 
certain rights that now exist as to others, and fills a gap 
in the present law for the protection of their property."' 
S. Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2- 3 (1960} 
(emphasis added). 
II 
While not conclusive on the issue before us, the commonly 
shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and 
lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power 
to try non-Indians carries considerable weight. Cf. Draper v. 
United States, 164 U. S. 240, 245-247 (1896); Morris v. 
Hitchcock , 194 U. S. 384, 391- 393 (1904); Warren Trading 
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 690 (1965); 
DeCoteau v. District Cty Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444- 445 (1965). 
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·executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed by 
Congress. These instruments, which beyond their actual text 
form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made 
Indian law, ca.nnot be interpreted in isolation but must be read 
in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions 
of those who drafted them. Ibid. 
While in isolation the Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 
( 1855), would appear to be silent as to tribal criminal j urisdic-
tion over non-Indians, the addition of historical perspective 
casts substantial doubt upou the existence of such jurisdic.:. 
tion.14 In the Ninth Article, for example, the Suquamish 
14 When treaties with the Washington Tribes were first contemplated, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent instructions to the Commission to 
Hold Treaties with the Indian Tribes in Washington Territory and in the 
Blackfoot Country. Included with the instructions were copies of treaties 
previously negotiated with the Omaha Indians, 10 Stat. 1043, and with the 
Oto and Misr,;ouri Indians, 10 Stat. 1038, which the Commissioner "regarded 
as exhibiting provisions proper on the part of the Government and 
advantages to the Indian::;" and which he felt would "afford valuable 
suggestions." The criminal provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott are 
clearly patterned after the criminal provisions in these "exemplary" 
treaties, in most respects copying the provisions Vterbatim. Like the 
Treaty of Point Elliott, the treaties with the Omaha and with the Oto and 
Missouri did not specificai!y address the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. 
Sometime after the receipt of these instructions, the Washington treaty 
Commission itself prepared and discussed a draft treaty which specifically 
provided that "[i]njuries committed by whites towards them [are] not to 
be revenged, but on complaint being made they shall be tried by the Laws 
of the United States and if convicted the offenders punished." For some 
unexplained reason, however, in negotiating a treaty with the Indians, the 
Commission went back to the langu&ge used in the two "exemplary" 
treaties sent. by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Although respondents 
contend that the Commission returned to the original language because of 
tribal opposition to relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, there is no evidence to support this view of the matter. Instead, 
it seems probable that the Commission preferred to use the language tha.t 
had been recommended by the Office of Indian Affairs. As discussed 
below, the language ultimately used, wherein the Tribe acknowledged their 
dependence on the United States and promised to be "friendly with aU 
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"acknowledge their dependence on the Government of the 
United States." As Chief Justice Marshall explained in 
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,551-552,554 (1832), such an 
acknowledgement is not a mere abstract recognition of the 
United States' sovereignty. "The Indian nations were, from 
their situation, necessarily dependent on [the United States] 
for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into 
their country." !d., at 554. By acknowledging their depend-
ence on the United States, in the Treaty of Point Elliott, the 
Suquamish were in all probability recognizing that the United 
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders who came 
within their reservation. Other provisions of the Treaty also 
point to the absence of tribal jurisdiction. Thus the tribe 
"agree [s] not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws 
of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities 
for trial." Read in conjunction with 18 U. S. C. § 1152, which 
extends federal enclave 1aw to non-Indian offenses on Indian 
reservations. this provision implies that the Suquamish are to 
promptly deliver up any non-Indian offender, rather than try 
and punish him themselves.H 
By themselves, these treaty provisions would probably not 
be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
if the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction. But an 
examination of our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even 
ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, Indians da 
citizens thereof," could well have been understood as acknowledging 
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
1 5 In intrrpreting Indian treatie,; and statutes, '· r d]oubtful expressions 
are to br resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the 
wards of tht> nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.". 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973), see 
The Kansas Indians. 5 Wall. 737, 760 (1866) ; United States v. Nice, 241 
U . S. 591, 599 (1916) . But treaty and statutory provisions which are not 
clear on their face may " be clear from the surrounding circumstances and 
legislative history." Cf. D eCoteau v. District Cty Ct., 420 U. S. 425, 444. 
(1975), 
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not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirm-
ative delegation of such power by Congress. Indian tribes do 
retain elements of "quasi-sovereign" authority after ceding 
their lands to the United States and announcing their depend-
ence on the Federal Government. See The Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 5 Peters 1, 15 (1831). As we decide today in United 
States v. Wheeler, post, at -, the power of Indian tribes to 
govern the lives of their members, including the power to 
punish members who transgress a.gainst their laws, flows from 
this retained quantum of governing authority and does not 
rely on affirmative congressional authorization. But the 
tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited only 
by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are pro-
scribed from exercising both those powers of autonomous 
. states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those 
powers "inconsistent with t'heir status." 544 F. 2d . at 1009. 
Indian reservations are "a part of the territory of the United 
States." United States v. ·Rogers, 4 How. 567, 571 (1846). 
Indian tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the 
assent of the United States, and under their authority." Id., 
at 572. Upon incorporation into the territory of the United 
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial 
sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate 
power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of 
this overriding sovereignty. "[T]heir rights of complete 
sovereignty, as independent na.tions, ·[are] necessarily dimin-
ished." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823). 
We have already described some of the inherent limitations 
on tribal powers th11t stem from their incorporation into the 
United States. In Johnson v. M'lntosh , supra, we noted that 
the Indian tribes' "power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomever they pleased," was inherently lost to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States. And in The 
'(Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, the Chief Justice observed 
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that since Indian tribes are "completely under the sovereignty 
and dominion of the United States .... any attempt [by 
foreign nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political 
C0111lex10n with them, would be considered by all as an inva-
sion of our territory. and an act of hostility." 5 Pet. , at 16. 
Nor are the intrinsi'c limitations on Indian tribal authority 
restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands 
or exercise external political sovereignty. In the first case to 
reach this Court dealing with the fltatus of Indian tribes, Mr. 
Justice Johnson in a sepa.rate concurrence summarized the 
nature of the limitations inherently flowing from the over-
riding sovereignty of the United States as follows: "[T]he 
restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amounts ... 
to an exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from 
their markets; a.nd the limitation upon their sovereignty 
amounts to the right of governing every person within their 
limits except themselves." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147 
(1810) (separa.te opinion of Johnson, J.). Protection of ter-
ritory within its external political boundaries is, of course. 
central to the sovereign interests of the United States as it is 
to any other sovereign nation. But from the formation of the 
Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United 
States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its 
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted 
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United 
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifesta-
tion of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting 
to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian 
tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try citizens 
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Con-
gress. This principle would have been obvious 11: century ago 
when most Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed 
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice." H. R. Rep. 
No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1834) . It should be no 
less obyio.us tQday, evet1 though present day Indian .. triba[ 
'·. 
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courts embody dramatic advances over their historical 
antecedents. 
In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) , the Court was 
faced with almost the inverse of the issue before us here-
whether. prior to the passage of the Major Crimes Act. federal 
courts had jurisdiction to try Indians who had offended 
against fellow Indians on reservation land. In concluding that 
criminal jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe, it found 
particular guidance in the "nature and circumstances of the 
case." The United States was seeking to extend United 
States 
"law. by argument and inference only, . . . over aliens 
and strangers; over the members of a community sep-
arated by race [and] tradition, ... from the authority 
and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints 
of an external and unknown code ... ; which judges 
them by a standard made by others and not for them .... 
It tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of 
their people, nor the law of their land, but by ... a 
different race, according to the law of a social state of 
which they have an imperfect conception. . .. " I d., 
at 571. 
These considerations, applied here to the non-Indian rather 
than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against the 
validity of respondents' contention that Indian tribes, although 
fully subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States, 
retain the power to try non-Indians according to their own 
customs and procedure. 
As previously noted, Congress extended the jurisdiction of 
federal courts. in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, to 
offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within 
Indian Country. In doing so, Congress was careful to extend 
to the non-Indian offender the basic criminal rights that would 
attach in non-Indian related cases. Under respondents' 
theory, however, Indian tribes would have been free to try the 
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same non-Indians without these careful proceedings unless 
Congress affirmatively legislated to the contrary. Such an 
exercise of .i urisdiction over non-Indian citizens of the United 
States would belie the tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty in 
return for the protection of the United States. 
In summary, respondents' position ignores that 
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the United 
States. The soil and people within these limits are under 
the political control of the Government of the United 
States. or of the States of the Union. There exists in the 
broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may 
be cities. counties, and other organized bodies with limited 
legislative functions, but they . . . exist in subordination 
to one or the other of these two." United States v. 
Kagarna, 118 U.S. 375,379 (1886). 
We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have 
become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many 
respects their state counterpa.rts. We also acknowledge that 
with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which 
extends certain basic procedural rights to anyone tried in 
Indian tribal court, many of the dangers that might have 
accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians only a few decades ago have disappeared. 
Finally. we are not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian 
crime on today's reservations which the tribes forcefully argue 
requires the ability to try non-Indians.1n But these are con-
siderations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian 
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians. They 
have little relevance to the principles which lead us to conclude 
·1.6 See 4 National American Indi1111 Conrt .Judges Association, .Justice and 
the American Indian 51-52 (Hl74) ; HParings on S. 1 and S. 1400 (Reform 
of the Federal Criminal Law~) bE-fore 1br Subcommittee on Criminal Laws 
and Proeodures of th~> Senatl' Committee on the .Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess., Part VIII, p . 6469 et seq . (1973). 
• 
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that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and 
punish nonmembers of their tribe. The judgments below are 
therefore reversed. 
Reversed. 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN took no part in the consideration or 
decision of this case . 
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February 23, 1978 
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an this very difficult subject. 
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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MEMORANDUM TO MR o JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: Nancy 
RE: Oliphant opinion Feb. 27, 1978 
As I mentioned to you earlier, the crux of this 
opinion is that upon the formation of the United States, 
Indian tribes lost their inherent sovereignty insofar as 
trying non-Indians was conceun~ The opinion draws a dis-
true 
tinction between/sovereignty and the limited sovereignty 
of the Indian tribes, wh~h allowed them to govern themselves 
but did not include the power to try non-Indians o The 
opinion does not state that although Indian tribes once might 
criminal 
have been sovereign, Congress explicitly took away/jurisdiction 
over non-Indians 9 either through § 1152 (the interracial 
Eimexxxx crimes statute) or otherwise o 
Thete are certain problems with this approach o I 
wonder, under the opinion's reasoning, whether a tribe would 
have criminal jurisdiction over an Indian wax who nevertheless 
is not a member of the tribe asserting jurisdictiono I assume 
1 ~~ that the tribe would ~ have such jurisdiction, since it would 
: ~ ~ ·-'"1L~~ 4 ~ 
-'•...P- Iff..- ~~4.<-c .. ~  ,,J 
~ ~~&..e~~~ .. ,laric:..J~ .. 
1'\ 
not be a facet of xi self-government. 
A theoretical problem is how do we know that whatever 
inherent criminal jurisdiction Indian tribes possessed was 
taken away when the United States became sovereign. The first 
section of the opinion is devoted to this problem, I think; 
it chronicles the assumptions of people in the 19th ~ 
century, who were closer to this issue than we are, that 
the Indians lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indianso 
I find the 19th century evidence persuasive; there really 
has HB never been much doubt in my mind that 19th century 
Congresses that enacted Indian legislation and enacted 
treaties assumed that the Indians could not try non-Indians. 
Because of this,axKHMpXiBR I had thought before that the 
Court could say that Congress implicitly took away whatever 
criminal jurisdiction the Indians might have had in the 
various Trade and Intercourse Acts in the 19th century. 
But this approach met with the problem that there was no 
explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction by Congress, and under 
the presumption in favor of construing statute:S/ in the 
Indians' favor, it seemed that such an explicit withdrawal 
of jurisdiction would have to be found in order to rule against 
the Indians o It was for this reason that Buzz Thompson, who 
drafted WHR's opinion, decided to take the approach he did. 
The tack that probably will be taken by the dissent is 
I 
that sovereignty includes all power within a certain territory, 
and cannot be dissected the way the majority doeso Although 
I would tend to agree with this as a general priniiple, the 
nature of tribal jurisdiction has never been so clear. 
Tribes obviously lack some of the basic powers of sovereignty, ~ 
such as the power to dispose of land within the sovereign's 
territory. For this reason, I do not think the majority's 
position is untenable in saying that criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians is one of the things that was given up 
when the tribes accepted the ultimate sovereignty of the 
United States o 
A problem that still remains is that the Ccurt has ~ 
intimated that Indian courts could assert civil jurisdiction J 
over non-Indians. Of course in the cases involving civil 
jurisdiction, this Court's holdings mostly have been that 
II 
,, 
the state courts could not assert jurisdiction over a 
dispute between an indian and a non-Indian that arose &f 
on tribal land o It does not necessarily follow that the T~ -
dispute must be resolved by a triaal court. But I think that 
fatal 
conclusion might follow. Buzz does not see aR/inconsistency 
between the assertion of civil jurisdiction and the denial 
of criminal jurisdiction, however, because of the significant 
difference between civil and crlminal proceedings o He draws 
an xi analogy (not in the opinion) between civil proceedings 
and arbitration. Although civil disputes may be submitted 
to an arbitrator, we would not allow criminal disputes to be 
so handledo Similarly, it's okay for a tribal court to 
adjudicate a civil dispute between Indian and non~indian, 
because the interests at stake are not comparable to those 
in a £X criminal proceeding~. 
Because I think this is a difficult case, I would 
recommend that you await the dissent before voting. This is 
a fairly feeble recommendation, however, because my instinctive 
feeling is that the majority's result is the correct one. 
And because of the problems that would attend an attempt to 
say that Congress actually withdrew Indian criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, I do not think I could write a decent 
concurrence along those lineso Buzz told me that he read 
every word of every 19th century treaty, in addition to 
all the legislative history of the 19th century Indian 
statutes, before concluding that the opinion could not be 
written to say that there was such a withdrawal of jurisdictiono 
If I were voting, I would want to see the dissent before 
doing so, just to make sure I understood the arguments for 
\ 
the other point of view; but my hunch is that I would vote 
with the majority in the endo 
Nancy 
.§UlJr.tlltt Qflllttf .o-f tJrt ~ ~taft$ 
Jfa.s<.fringt.ott, ~· QJ. 2lTbiJl.$ 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Bregstein DATE: Jan. 6, 1978 
RE: No. 76-5729, Oliphant & Belgarde v. The 
Suquamish Indian Tribe 
I. Introduction 
This is a very complicated case, and there is no 
easy answer. There may not even be an answer, but I will 
try to point out some of the relevant considerations. This 
memo will not be able to go into all the intricacies of the 
relevant {and tangential) treaties and statutes discussed 
in the briefs of the parties and amici; and my conclusions 
will be tentative and subject to further illumination at 
oral argument. I will discuss the issues in the order they 
are presented in most of the briefs: inherent tribal 
sovereignty; assuming such sovereignty, whether it has been 
relinquished voluntarily by the tribe or taken away by 
federal statute or treaty; whether exclusive jurisdiction 
has been vested in the tribe by virtue of the Treaty of 
Point Elliott; effect of Pub. L. 280 and the various 
actions taken pursuant to that statute by the State of 
Washington. First, though, I'll attempt to summarize 
significant developments in Indian law as they relate to 
criminal jurisdiction, as background. This summary is 
taken largely from Clinton, Development of Criminal 
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: The Historical 
Perspective, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 951 (1975). You may be 
familiar with much of this already. 
II. A Summary of Developments in Indian Law 
At first, Congress dealt with Indian tribes 
primarily by treaty. This was consistent with the European 
practice of treating the tribes as sovereign nations. 
During the very early period (1778-1796) Congress treated 
the tribes as sovereign nations; and 
many of the early treaties recognized the Indians' 
jurisdiction to deal with non-Indians who settled 
on Indian lands and committed crimes thereon. 
Such jurisdictional grants apparently assumed that 
the Indian tribes were sovereign and possessed 
complete governmental powers over their own lands, 
including the powers to try non-Indians." 
Clinton, at 954. Clinton notes, however, that even during 
this early period many treaties provided for federal 
prosecution of Indians who commited crimes against 
non-Indians on the Indians' land. This observation seems 
to indicate that at first Congress was more concerned about 
asserting federal jurisdiction when the victim was a 
non-Indian than when the alleged perpetrator was a 
non-Indian. By 1789, however, a treaty with several Indian 
tribes provided for the trial in territorial or state court 
of non-Indians who committed crimes in Indian territory. 
This treaty also provided that the tribe could try 
non-Indians who settled in Indian territory illegally, but 
this really is a distinct situation and not dispositive of 
jurisdiction to try non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian 
territory when they were there legally. 
After 1796, Clinton says, treaty provisions 
allowing Indians to try non-Indians virtually disappeared. 
"The trend was away from a land sovereignty notion of 
jurisdiction and toward a concept based primarily on the 
citizenship of the parties." Id. 955. "Federal 
jurisdiction, which had previously been limited to 
situations in which the victim was a citizen of the United 
States, was now extended to cases in which either the 
perpetrator or the victim was a citizen or resident of the 
United States." Id. 
It could be argued from this pattern that the 
absence of such a provision, providing for federal 
prosecution of non-Indians, in the treaty entered into with 
the Suquamish in 1855 (the Treaty of Point Elliott) 
indicated that the tribe retained jurisdiction. This 
point, and the relevance of the Treaty in general, will be 
discussed in Part Iy.A., infra. For now it is sufficient 
to note that Clinton is talking about the period around 
1796; it may be that by the time the treaty was signed with 
~ the Suquamish, it was taken for granted that Indians would 
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. This 
hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that the Cherokees 
insisted on including a provision in their treaty of 1866 
that would give them jurisdiction over intra-tribal 
matters. If Indian tribes have any inherent sovereignty, 
surely it would be over such matters; yet a provision to 
that effect was included. It appears that it is not 
terribly safe to assume that the reason for the inclusion 
of a certain provision was that in its absence, the 
contrary state of affairs would have obtained. It is hard 
to tell whether provisions were included to confirm the 
status quo or to change it. 
What I find most notable about Clinton's 
description of this early period is the trend to include 
treaty provisions for federal prosecution of Indians who 
committed interracial crimes. Clinton notes that this 
development constituted a gradual infringement on tribal 
sovereignty. On the other hand, federal responsibility for 
prosecuting non-Indians for interracial crimes seems to 
have been assumed almost from the outset and was not 
considered as significant an intrusion as the later 
assertion of jurisdiction over Indians. 
The use of treaties ended in 1871, when the House 
(which had not say in treaty-making) succeeded in enacting 
a measure that provided that no Indian tribe would 
thereafter be recognized as an independent nation with whom 
the United States could contract by treaty. 
, Certain federal statutes were enacted even during 
the treaty-making period. The most important one for our 
purposes is now codified at 18 u.s.c. § 1152 (the 
"interracial crimes" section). This provision originally 
was enacted as part of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 
1790. It originally provided for federal prosecution of 
United States citizens or residents who committed any crime 
or trespassed on Indian land. Clinton, at 958. The Act 
was expanded significantly in 1817 to provide for federal 
prosecution of Indians who committed crimes in Indian 
territory. "In expressly providing a federal forum for 
crimes committed by an Indian, Congress expanded federal 
jurisdiction for the first time to cases in which the 
defendant was an Indian .... " Id. 959. (Note again 
that Clinton regards the coverage of Indians--not non-
Indians--as the significant expansion of federal 
jurisdiction.) Intra-Indian crimes were specifically 
excepted. This statute later became part of § 25 of the 
first permanent Trade and Intercourse Act in 1834, was 
amended the last time in 1854, and eventually was codified 
at 18 u.s.c § 1152. 
(During this early period the states were not 
involved in this jurisdiction maze, because Indians had 
been moving west faster than states. It was not until 1861 
that Congress confronted the problem of allocating 
jurisdiction when an Indian reservation was located in a 
state and otherwise would be subject to the jurisdiction of 
6. 
the state; then Congress required states to disclaim 
jurisdiction over Indian lands as a condition to admission 
to the Union.) 
is: 
Clinton's conclusion about the period up to 1871 
"[D]uring this period Congress slowly encroached 
on the tribal jurisdiction over Indian territory 
by providing a federal forum for the trial of 
crimes committed on Indian lands in which either 
the victim or perpetrator of the crime was a 
non-Indian. While such enactments began, as did 
the treaties, P.Y_granting federal jurisdiction 
only where the alleged perpetrator of the crime 
was non-Indian, by the end of the treaty period 
both the treaties and the statutes also granted 
the federal courts criminal jurisdiction if a 
serious crime were committed by an Indian against 
the person or property of a non-Indian." 
Id. 961 (emphasis supplied). 
~ J lf1/ 
~·~ 
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The other major statute relevant to this case is ~~ 
the M~t, now 18 u.s.c. § 1153. Congress tt::Zc_/- ~ 1 V 'J'~-
passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885. It was the greatest 
intrusion into tribal jurisdiction over criminal offenses 
thus far because it provided for federal jurisdiction even 
when both ~e vicjjm~ the alleged perpetrator were 
~~ 
Indians and the crime took place on Indian land. (Even 
today, however, it is not clear whether the Major Crimes 
Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction. Several 
lower courts have so held, but this Court has not addressed 
the question. In Talton v. Ma~, 163 u.s. 376, however, 
the Court ruled on a question involving a criminal trial in 
a tribal court where the offense was murder, and therefore 
should have been held in federal court if the Major Crimes 




w-4-~t.. ,.. A .... _____, 
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7. -Act had not ousted tribal jurisdiction over the offense. 
The Court probably did not consider the question. 
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a treaty 
provision with the Cherokees required that they be allowed 
to try their own members for major crimes. See Clinton, at 
964 n. 75. It is not clear that this should make a 
difference, however, because unlike § 1152, § 1153 does not 
carve out an exception to federal jurisdiction for 
situations where a treaty provision gives exclusive 
jurisdiction to the tribe. Today the question is not of 
great practical significance, except for double jeopardy 
purposes, because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 
limited the sentencing power of tribal courts to 6 months 
in jail or a $500 fine. Thus an Indian could be tried for 





~./-4. ... , ... ~ 
minimal sentence.) ~r'V 
~ 
II. Inherent Tribal Sovereignty 
The parties and amici address the question whether 
tribes possess inherent sovereignty because they believe it 
will start the Court off with the correct presumption. 
Supposedly, if the Court is convinced that Indian tribes 
possess inherent sovereignty--i.e., independent of and not 
derived from congressional grant--then it would take 
explicit congressional action to take away such 
sovereignty. The parties seem to agree about this. On the 
other hand, if the Court can be convinced that tribes do 
not possess inherent sovereignty, and that the focus of 
8. -recent cases is simply to evaluate the relevant treaties 
and statutes, then petrs have a much better chance of 
winning, because the relevant statutes are not very clear. 
The Court might then construe the statutes as not granting 
tribal jurisdiction over alleged crimes by non-Indians. 
I am not sure that the respective views of tribal 
sovereignty are that helpful. Or, perhaps, the concept of 
------------------~---------, tribal sovereignty is such an amorphous and, at least in 
modern times, weak concept, that it does not take us very .......... .., 
far in reaching the correct result in this case. It is 
acknowledged that the federal government has the power to 
-----~ ~~-----------~'-----------------------define and restrict tribal sovereignty, which makes that 
sovereignty look very much like a grant of authority from 
Congress, as a practical matter, regardless of the original 
and theoretical explanation for the tribes' powers. Thus 
in the end it is most useful simply to attempt to glean 
Congress' understanding in enacting its various treaties 
and Indian statutes, without much of a presumption in 
either direction. The only presumption that should apply 
is the canon of construction with respect to Indians that 
statutes should be construed, as much as possible, in the 
Indians' favor. 
The early view of tribal sovereigny was fairly 
clear and "platonic", McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164. In his two opinions in Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, and Worcester v. Georgia, 6 
Pet. 515, Chief Justice Marshall described the Indian 
tribes as quasi-sovereign entities. This description was 
9 • 
used, at least in Worcester, to stave off an assertion of 
state jurisdiction. In subsequent cases, including fairly 
recent ones, the Court has adhered to the notion that the 
Indian tribes are sovereign, when the challenge comes from 
the state in which the tribe is located. A concept of 
federal preemption (as described in McClanahan) probably 
would lead to the same result in almost all cases involving 
attempted assertions of state jurisdiction. See 
McClanahan, supra, at 172 n. 8: 
"The extent of federal pre-emption and residual 
Indian sovereignty in the total absence of federal 
treaty obligations or legislation is therefore now 
something of a moot question. [Citations 
omitted.] The question is generally of little 
more than theoretical importance, however, since 
in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes 
define the boundaries of federal and state 
jurisdiction." 
In McClanahan the Court described the notion of tribal 
sovereignty as a "backdrop against which the applicable 
treaties and federal statutes must be read." 411 U.S. at 
172. 
Since it is well-settled that the Indian tribes 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the states unless 
Congress specifically so directs, the cases discussing 
------------~~------------------tribal sovereignty in the context of assertions of state 
jurisdiction are not very helpful in the present context. 
~' Fisher v. District Court, 424 u.s. 382 (1976); 
McClanahan, ~upra; Warren Trading_Post v. Tax Comm'n, 380 
U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217 (1958). The 
Washington Attorney General suggests that the concept of 




as a "shield to ward off assertions by the states of 
jurisdiction over Indians." Brief at 9. 
Recognizing that not all cases discussing tribal 
sovereignty have involved assertions of state jurisdiction, 
he suggests that the concept has been useful in one other 
area, also not relevant to this case: "It forms the basis 
for fending off attacks against federal legislation 
granting special treatment to Indians",~., Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 u.s. 535 (1974) (preference for Indians in the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs), or in validating the exercise of 
some congressional power with respect to Indians that might 
not have been valid with respect to purely voluntary 
groups,~., United States v. Mazurie, 419 u.s. 544 (1975) 
(delegation of power to the tribe to regulate liquor); 
United States v. Antelope, 
Major Crimes Act). 
u.s. (1977) (validity of 
Thus the Washington AG suggests that tribal ~~ ~ 
It " ~T~ 
jurisdiction is merely personal (over members of the . . 
---- ?"-"' .,.c C. C-) ~ 
tribe), and not_ ;:..::.ritorial. But this theory breaks down ~ •• • L'f 
in light of several decisions of this Court. The Court has J:z~ ~ :::f~""'-<# 
allowed the tribes to regulate various aspects of civil 
----conduct on the reservation, and to enforce their law 
against outsiders. This was true in Mazurie and in 
Williams v. Lee. In both cases, non-Indians on the 
reservation were required to submit their disputes with 
Indians to the tribal court, rather than the state courts. 
The AG is right, of course, that these decisions are 
distingu~h~b~ I rom the instant case both because this 
~..w-...w-
11. 
case involves criminal jurisdiction and because this case 
involves a conflict between federal and tribal authority, 
not state and tribal authority. But the fact remains that 
in certain cases, the Court has recognized tribal authority 
even without a congressional grant. Furthermore, it has 
been suggested (by yicki Jackson) that there was not a 
clear distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction 
in 19th century Indian affairs, so that sovereignty would 
be equally broad with respect to both spheres. 
Apart from the language in the cases involving 
attempted assertions of state sovereignty, the Court held 
in Talton v. Mayes, 163 u.s. 376 (1896), that the Fifth 
Amendment did not apply to the proceedings of a tribal 
court, because the court derived its power from tribal 
sovereignty, not from the federal government; and it held 
in the Puyull~ case that an Indian tribe possesses 
sovereign immunity, which, though waivable by Congress, 
exists in the first place independent of congressional 
grant. 
Furthermore, the right of tribes to punish 
criminal conduct between Indians on the reservation is not 
challenged. Of course it has been held that jurisdiction 
over offenses between non-Indians, even if committed on a 
reservation, is in the states; but this result seems to 
derive from an interpretation of the congressional enabling 
legislation admitting states into the Union, and therefore 
can be interpreted as an explicit congressional withdrawal 
of jurisdiction from the tribes. See United States v. 
12. -McBratney, 104 u.s. 621: Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 
240: New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496. 
Although there is no simple answer to the question 
whether tribes possess inherent sovereignty or not, I think -
the answer is that they do. Because it is recognized that 
Congress has plenary power to shape and limit the tribes' 
sovereignty, however, the relevant inquiry is into the 
statutes and treaties relating to Indian criminal 
jurisdiction. The approach is not as clear-cut as 
respondents would suggest, however. They combine the 
inherent sovereignty of the tribe with the canon of 
construction applicable to Indians and conclude that there 
must be very clear and explicit congressional action to 
withdraw the tribe's jurisdiction. But even in the context 
of state sovereignty, which is more concrete than tribal 
sovereignty and is explicitly protected by the Tenth 
Amendment, it is accepted that Congress may preempt state 
power by action Congress is constitutionally entitled to 
take. Since Congress' power to regulate Indian affairs is 
greater than its power to regulate the states, it would 
seem that less evidence of congressional preemption would 
be required in the Indian context than in the context of 
states. 
III. Relevant Statutes 
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 
Section 1152 provides: 
" Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, 
the general laws of the United States as to the 
punishment of offenses committed in any place 
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States, except the District of Columbia, 
shall extend to the Indian country. 





This section shall not extend to offenses 
committed by an Indian against the person or 
property of another Indian, nor to any Indians 
committing any offense in the Indian country who 
has been punished by the local laws of the tribe, 
or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the 
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or 
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively." 
This was the provision in effect at the time the Treaty of 
Point Elliott was signed, because the statute was last 
revised in 1854 {a year before the Treaty) . The 1854 
amendment inserted the second exception, for Indians who 
already had been punished by the tribe. 
First I will consider the SG's argument that the 
Suquamish fall within the third explicit exception to § 
1152, and therefore have exclusive jurisdiction over 
offenses committed on the reservation~ then I will consider 
the effect of § 1152 generally. 
A. The treaty exception 
The SG argues that the Treaty of Point Elliott 
gave the Suquamish exclusive jurisdiction and therefore 
§ 1152 does not apply by its own terms. I think there is 
little merit to this argument {so little, in fact, that 
respondents themselves did not even attempt to make it) . 
The SG's argument seems to be that since the Suquamish 
possessed full territorial sovereignty up to the time of 
the Treaty, we have to look to see whether that sovereignty 
{at least over criminal offenses of non-Indians) was 
voluntarily surrendered by the tribe or taken away. 
Because the treaty is silent as to criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, the SG concludes that there was no 
voluntary surrender; and the SG sees no action to take away 
14. 
the sovereignty in the successive forms of the Trade and 
Intercourse Act that ultimately became § 1152 or in the 
Treaty itself. (Since this latter argument is also 
relevant to the statutory analysis simpliciter, I will 
discuss it in the next section.) 
The objection to the SG's view is that silence in 
the Treaty does not indicate that Congress was leaving ------------ --- - -criminal jurisdiction in the tribe, but rather that it was ----------- - --
assumed that Indians did not have criminal jurisdiction ----.... ---- - -
over non-Indians. The SG counters by saying that many 
~
treaties were not silent. He also counters the argument 
suggested in Part II, ~upra (that by 1855 it was assumed 
that Indians did not possess criminal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians) by stating that Indian policy fluctuated and 
was not always consistent. But it seems to me that the 
SG's argument, if it proves anything, is that the federal 
government in general had not taken away criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, not that the Treaty of Point 
Elliott specifically provided for exclusive Indian 
jurisdiction. There is nothing in the Treaty to suggest an 
explicit reservation of such power to the tribe. 
(Furthermore, the SG recognizes that this notion 
of exclusive jurisdiction in the Tribe would have been very 
hard to honor before enactment of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act in 1968. The SG's argument--that the subsequent 
passage of legislation guaranteeing certain procedural 
safeguards in Indian trials makes acceptance of exclusive 
jurisdiction in the Tribe more palatable--makes the 
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more than a century later. This is hard to accept; and it 
is doubtful that 19th century Americans were more willing 
to give this kind of jurisdiction to an Indian tribe than 
20th century Americans would be. Thus the SG's 
characterization of the situation as an agreement between 
Indians and non-Indians that now can be fulfilled because 
of a fortuitous development sounds somewhat unrealistic.) 
B. Section 1152 in general 
The SG's alternative contention (along with 
• 
respondents') is that § 1152 vests jurisdiction in the 
f~deral governm~t over crimes taking place on Indian 
territory, but that this jurisdiction is simplY concurrent ____......, - -
with tribal jurisdiction. Petrs insist that federal 
jurisdiction under § 1152 is exclusive. Either conception 
may be right; all the evidence in either direction is quite 
equivocal. In following the canon of construction that 
statutes are to be construed in the Indians' favor, it 
probably would be advisable to rule that the jurisdiction 
is concurrent. But there are two objections to this tack, 
aside from the specific evidence, discussed infra, that 
congressional intent was to make § 1152 exclusive. 
First, the Court has recognized that this canon of 
construction is no more than an aid to construction; it 
does not license the Court to rule in favor of the Indians 
when such an interpretation cannot logically be gleaned 
from the statutory framework. In DeCoteau v. District 
County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447, the Court said (emphasis 
in original): 
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"But we cannot rewrite the 1889 Agreement and the 
1891 statute. For the courts to reinstate the 
entire reservation, on the theory that retention 
of mere allotments was ill-advised, would carry us 
well beyond the rule by which legal ambiguities 
are resolved to the benefits of the Indians. We 
give this rule the broadest possible scope, but it 
remains at base a canon for construing the complex 
treaties, statutes, and contracts which define the 
status of Indian tribes. A canon of construction 
is not a license to disregard clear expressions of 
tribal and congressional intent." 
The complex pattern of statutes and treaties in the instant 
case does not contain "clear expressions of tribal and 
congressional intent", however, so the above quotation is 
not completely applicable. But this case tests the limits 
of the canon of construction, because here Congress' 
underlying understanding seems clear, while its 
pronouncements were not. 
Second, there is difficulty here even in applying - - -the canon of construction. When § 1152 was enacted (in its 
--------~,--------~ earlier forms), Congress thought it was dojng something 
good for the Indians. It was recognized that tribal law 
and courts were not adequate to punish non-Indians who 
committed crimes in Indian territory; the provision of 
federal prosecution was viewed as a benefit to the 
Indians. On the other hand, it would have been hard to 
argue in the 19th century, and even harder today, that the 
Indians would not have been more benefitted by the 
provision of federal prosecution concurrent with tribal 
authority, than that the federal jurisdiction was meant to 
oust tribal jurisdiction. 
With these caveats in mind, I will examine the 
arguments for and against exclusive federal jurisdiction. 
-
First, there is the language of § 1152 itself. 
The section provides that the law governing offenses 
committed "in any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of 
Columbia, shall extend to Indian country." This language 
can be interpreted in one of two ways. Petrs argue that 
the language means that conduct in Indian country is viewed 
as if it occurred in any place under the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States, i.e., Indian country is 
subjected to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the 
United States. At first blush this reading seemed 
implausible to me, because the interpretation offered by 
respondents seemed more logical. Respondents' 
interpretation is that the quoted language simply 
identifies the body of law to be applied in Indian country, 
i.e., the body of law applicable in federal enclaves. The 
statute does not convert Indian country into a federal 
enclave, however, and has nothing to do with whether 
federal law in Indian country is to be exclusive or 
concurrent with the resdiuum of sovereignty possessed by 
tribes. Either interpretation seems plausible; and I would 
not draw any hard and fast conclusions from the statutory 
language itself. If the canon of construction in favor of 
Indians is applied, the ambiguous language probably should 
be taken to identify the body of law applicable under 
§ 1152, and not to proclaim Indian country to be within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 
' t • ., 
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'-"" 
Second, petrs argue: "To hold that federal 
jurisdiction over Indian land is exclusive as to the state, 
but concurrent with tribal jurisdiction discriminates 
against the natural sovereign rights of state citizens." 
Petrs' brief at 109. I am not sure I understand this 
point, but as I understand it, it is wrong. The premise of 
the argument is that without federal intercession, the 
state would be sovereign over Indian reservations within 
the state's borders. This harks back to petr's argument 
that tribal power comes from the federal government and not 
from the inherent sovereignty the tribe possessed before 
conquest. Such an argument, as explained in Part II, 
supra, seems to be wrong under this Court's decisions. 
An argument could be made, however, that since 
federal legislation preempts state legislation on the same 
subject, despite the fact that states are at least as 
sovereign as Indian tribes, why should the result be any 
different when the federal government legislates with 
respect to a subject as to which the tribe otherwise would 
have been sovereign? I suppose the answer to this would be 
that federal legislation is not preemptive when Congress 
does not intend it to be; and here it could be argued that 
Congress intended federal criminal jurisdiction to be 
concurrent with tribal jurisdiction. 
Third, § 1152 is comprehensive except for three 
specified exceptions. Federal jurisdiction does not exist 
when the crime takes place between Indians, when the Indian 
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already has been punished by the tribe, or when treaty 
provisions provide for exclusive tribal jurisdiction. The 
parties have described the second exception as a "double 
jeopardy" exception. The exception refers only to the 
previous trial of an Indian by the tribe, not to the 
previous trial of a non-Indian. Petrs argue, therefore, 
that since it is inconceivable that Congress wanted to 
protect Indians from double jeopardy while ignoring the 
possible double jeopardy plight of a non-Indian, the only 
rational explanation is that Congress assumed tribes could 
not try non-Indians. 
Respondents have several answers to this. (a) The 
"double jeopardy" exception was enacted in response to the 
trial of an Indian who already had been punished by the 
tribe; Congress' concern was limited by that factual 
context. (b) Even if the omission of reference to 
non-Indians was advertant, the explanation might be that 
Congress was willing to leave punishment of Indians to the 
tribes, but was not willing to forego punishment of 
non-Indians, even if they already had been punished by a 
tribe. (This is a direct rebuttal of petr's view that 
Congress would have been as concerned, if not more, with 
the double jeopardy problem of trying non-Indians twice.) 
(c) It is not apparent that Congress assumed that Indians 
could not try non-Indians; Congress may well have assumed 
that Indians would not do so, but this would have been 
because of lack of inclination rather than lack of power. 
(Indeed, yicki Jackson's theory of this case is that 
~ Congress did not distinguish between Indian civil and 
criminal jurisdiction in the 19th century, because the 
Indians did not draw that distinction. Rather, they 
punished their own members by requiring restitution to the 
injured person and rituals of shaming, etc.--without true 
criminal trials--and the Indians would not have been 
motivated to "try" non-Indians in this way.) 
I tend to think that conceiving of the second 
exception as a double jeopardy provision is erroneous. It 
is more likely that respondents' second point is correct: 
Congress was not concerned with punishing an Indian who 
already had been punished by his tribe. On the other hand, 
the fact that no reference is made to non-Indians is 
evidence that Congress did not think Indians either could 
or would try non-Indians. 
Fourth, petrs argue that the jurisdiction 
conferred by § 1152 must have been exclusive because 
concern was expressed in Congress that the provision might 
infringe Indian sovereignty, and if there was to be any 
infringement, it would have to be because no Indian 
jurisdiction would be left. Simple concurrent jurisdiction 
would not amount to an infringement. There is no easy 
answer to this contention. If not for the third exception 
to § 1152 (for situations where treaties guarantee the 
tribe exclusive jurisdicton) it might have been argued that 
even concurrent jurisdiction would infringe the rights of 
tribe's whose treaties provided for exclusive tribal 
jurisdiction. But given this exception, petrs' argument 
has some force. On the other hand, the exception might 
have been enacted to assuage the worries of those 
legislators who were concerned about infringing tribal 
sovereignty. 
Fifth, all the precedents hold that Indians could ... -not try non-Indians. This includes one circuit court 
... -decision, Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 
1878), dictum in one Supreme Court decision, In re 
Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107 (1891), two opinions of the Attorney 
General, and the opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior 
(1970) until it was withdrawn after the district court 
decision in this case. Respondents attack most of the . 
reasoning in these various sources, and their attack is 
persuasive. In Kenyon, for example, the conduct at issue 
took place on land outside an Indian reservation, so the 
decision is not relevant to the assertion of jurisdiction 
on reservation. On the other hand, the inability of tribes 
to punish non-Indians has been the law for over a century; 
and this is the first case challenging the status quo. 
Perhaps that is evidence in itself of what the 19th century 
assumptions were, on the part of Congress and the tribes. 
Respondent's main arguments are that since the 
Trade and Intercourse Acts were enacted for the benefit of 
the Indians (to provide for punishment of offenders not 
punished by the tribe), it should not be construed to oust 
concurrent tribal jurisdiction; that the inclusion in many 
treaties of a provision divesting the Indians of 
jurisdiction over non-Indians would not make sense, and 
would be surplusage, if § 1152 already accomplished that 
'• 
result; and that until 1854, when the statute was amended 
to include the exception an Indian who already had been 
tried, the statute could not possibly have been considered 
exclusive, because if it was, a tribe's sovereignty over 
its own members would have been withdrawn. 
I find it very difficult to evaluate the relative 
merits of these competing arguments. I do not think there 
was affirmative intent on Congress' part to vest 
jurisdiction of non-Indians in the tribes. But in this -
context--where tribes started off sovereign--such 
affirmative intent is not necessary. Congress probably 
thought either that the situation would not come up (i.e., 
that tribes woul£ not assert such jurisdiction), or that 
tribes could not assert such jurisdiction (i.e, that 
federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes was to be 
exclusive). In other words, I would imagine that if 
Congress had been confronted with the question whether 
tribes should be allowed to assert criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians, it would have answered in the negative. 
This would follow from the trend, noted in Part II, ~upra, 
to vest more and more jurisdiction in the federal 
government. And, as noted in Part I, federal jurisdiction 
was asserted over non-Indian defendants, in treaty 
provisions, before it was asserted over Indian defendants. 
As a matter of fact, a bill (the Western Territory bill) 
was rejected, at the same time the 1934 Trade and 
Intercourse Act was passed, that would have provided for 
concurrent jurisdiction between the tribes and the federal 
government. Petrs say that the bill was rejected partly 
because of this provision, but we do not really know why 
the bill was not passed.) 
Since Congress did not speak explicitly to this 
point, the question is whether its tacit assumption that 
such jurisdiction would or could not be asserted by the 
tribes is sufficient to oust tribal jurisdiction. I am at 
an impasse on this point. In a normal case, I think I 
would conclude that this was sufficient; the question in 
this case is whether the presumption in favor of a 
construction favorable to the Indians tips the scale enough 
to come out the other way. 
C. Relevance of § 1153 (the MaiQ!_Crimes Act) 
The SG asserts, brief at 26 n. 19, that the Major 
Crimes Act is irrelevant to this case because none of the 
crimes specified in it are involved here. But the SG 
concedes that the enactment of this statute "shows that the 
Congress then [in 1885] apparently thought Secion 1152 
covered offenses by non-Indians on reservations but not, or 
not always, offenses by Indians against non-Indians." 
(Emphasis in original.) This is because the Major Crimes 
Act applies only to crimes between Indians; the natural 
,._, . 
assumption therefore is that Congress thought, at the time 
it passed the Major Crimes Act, that offenses by 
non-Indians already were covered by § 1152. Petrs draw 
this very inference. 
Petrs also argue that the Major Crimes Act 
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, and therefore 
§ 1152 must do the same. Otherwise, only the federal 
government could try and punish Indians for major crimes, 
while tribes could punish non-Indians for such major 
crimes. This makes no sense. The possible flaw in this 
argument, however, is that this Court has not held that the 
Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, although the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have 
so held. Under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, tribal 
courts may not impose sentences of more than 90 days or 
$500, or both. This suggests that tribes may not try 
anyone for major crimes, because otherwise the potential 
punishment would not fit the crime. It is unlikely that 
Congress would have considered this a desirable situation. 
Furthermore, the Major Crimes Act does not contain an 
exclusion for an Indian who already has been tried. Amicus 
Kitsap County notes that a logical explanation for this is 
that Congress thought it was precluding any exercise of 
tribal jurisdiction over major crimes when it enacted 
§ 1153. 
As for legislative history, Kitsap points out that 
a predecessor of the Major Crimes Act that would have 
provided for concurrent jurisdiction was rejected. On the 
other hand, respondents point to legislative history to 
show that Congress explicitly rejected the idea of making 
federal jurisdiction over major crimes exclusive. At first 
a provision in the Act provided that Indians accused of 
violating laws of the Territory would be tried in the 
Territorial courts "and not otherwise". A Congressman 
objected to this provision, and it was deleted. No 
explanation is given for the deletion, however. 
D. Summary 
As indicated in all of the above, I think there is 
no clear answer to the question whether § 1152 jurisdiction 
is exclusive or concurrent with tribal jurisdiction. The -
whole statutory framework makes more sense, I think, if 
federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes is regarded as 
exclusive. This follows primarily from the absence of any 
reference to non-Indians in the exceptions to § 1152 and 
the anomaly that would result if tribes could try 
non-Indians for major crimes (because they would have 
concurrent jurisdiction of crimes committed by non-Indians, 
which are not covered by § 1153) while they could not try 
their own members for major crimes. The latter proposition 
depends on the question whether § 1153 is exclusive, 
however, and the answer to that question is far from clear. 
IV. Constitutional Considerations 
A possible way to approach this dilemma is to see 
which result would cause greater constitutional problems. 
Although not directly relevant to the threshold 
jurisdictional question, an answer to the question whether 
a trial by the tribe would violate petrs' constitutional 
rights might point the Court in the right direction. 
Unfortunately, either result seems to portend 
constitutional problems. 
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If, the Cour~  there will be serious 
constitutional problems. Aside from all the constitutional 
challenges that inevitably will be made to the procedures 
at trial, there are two more basic problems. Non-Indians 
cannot participate in tribal government and they cannot be -on the jury. Neither of these problems could be solved by 
requiring the participation of non-Indians in tribal 
governments or on their juries without interfereing with 
the present federal policy in favor of tribal integrity. 
If non-Indians had to participate in affairs of tribal 
government, the tribe would become no more than a unit of 
local government or a voluntary association. As for the 
procedures at trial, it as as yet unclear whether the 
Indian Civil Rights Act will provide safeguards as broad as 
the constitutional guarantees themselves. This is fine for 
Indians, who did not have the benefit of constitutional 
rights at all before the Act, but it amounts to a 






On the other hand, a ruling in favor of petrs (!us. 
~··...t·•-) 
would not be wholly without potential constitutional 
,...,__ ~._...~~ ........_.... ~ 
problems. If Congress decides to grant criminal ---jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribes, it would seem that 
all constitutional guarantees would have to be provided at 
such trials. This is because the grant of jurisdiction 
would be construed as a delegation of part of the criminal 
jurisdiction of the federal government. But if Congress 
should decide to confer such jurisdiction on Indian tribes, 
the problem of the constitutional rights of non-Indians is 
no greater than if the Court were to affirm. 
7 
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V. State Jurisdiction 
A final factor that must be mentioned is the claim 
that the State of Washington has assumed jurisdiction over 
the Suquamish tribe and reservation pursuant to Pub. L. 
280, enacted in 1953. Through this act, Congress mandated 
certain states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country, 
and permitted other states (including Washington) to assume 
such jurisdiction. At first, all that was required to 
effect an assumption of jurisdiction by the state was state 
legislation and an amendment of the constitution of those 
states whose constitutions disclaimed any jurisdiction over 
Indian lands. The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 changed 
this procedure, to require the consent of tribes for the 
assumption of jurisdiction; but that requirement is not 
relevant in this case, where Washington purported to assume 
jurisdiction over Indian lands before the 1968 Act. 
Petrs and the state argue that the state validly 
effected this assumption of jurisdiction. In 1957 the 
state enacted legislation to assert full civil and criminal 
jurisdictions over reservations that consented to such an 
assumption of jurisdiction. (This requirement of consent 
was a matter of state law, unrelated to the ultimate 
requirement enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights 
Act.) The Suquamish tribe consented, but the state never 
amended its constitution. In 1963 the state enacted 
another statute providing for assumption of jurisdiction, 
regardless of tribal consent; but this statute included an 
----exemption, except as to eight listed matters (none of which 
are present here), for "Indians when on their tribal or 
allotted lands" when those lands are held in trust. The 
state's jurisdiction thus would extend to Belgarde's case 
because it took place off tribal or allotted land; it might 
apply to Oliphant's case, depending on whether the 
exemption of Indians on tribal land applies only to conduct 
£y Indians or also to conduct involving Indians. The SG 
notes that the only question in Belgarde would be whether 
state jurisdiction preempted tribal law and tribal courts 
or whether the two are concurrent. The SG suggests, 
correctly I think, that "[t]hese are difficult issues which 
have not been addressed by the court of appeals, and which 
may not be appropriate for initial consideration here." 
SG's brief at 49. 
There are all sorts of other complications here, 
however, involving whether the assumptions of jurisdiction 
were effective (resps argue that they were not because the 
Washington constitution was not amended) and whether the 
state's partial retrocession of jurisdiction (giving up all 
but the jurisdiction assumed under the 1963 law) was 
valid. The issue whether Washington's retrocession of 
jurisdiction is valid is present in the Yakima case, which 
is being held for Oliphant. The SG urges the Court not to 
decide this point (if it must be reached) before deciding 
Yakima. I will not go into all of this, because if the 
Court decides to hold that the Indians do not have 
jurisdiction over petrs, it will be unnecessary to decide 
whether the federal government (through §§ 1152 and 1153) 
has jurisdiction or whether the state has jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, if all the evidence thus far 
convinces you that you want to affirm on the ground that 
§ 1152 did not preempt tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians, then it is necessary to consider the state's 
29. 
claim to jurisdiction. The argument would be that Pub. L. 
280 and Washington's assumption of jurisdiction displaced 
tribal jurisdiction; the counter-argument, again, would be 
that the state and tribal jurisdiction are concurrent. In 
terms of analysis, it seems to me that the result here 
should not be any different than the result under § 1152. 
Pub. L. 280 was intended to give to the state's what the 
federal government had under § 1152; if § 1152 is viewed as 
exclusive, the assumption of jurisdiction by the state also 
should be viewed as exclusive (although, as noted above, 
this question need not be reached once it is decided that 
the federal government took away tribal jurisdiction when 
it enacted § 1152). On the other hand, if § 1152 
established concurrent jurisdiction, then the same should 
be true of the state's jurisdiction assumed pursuant to 
Pub. L. 280. In short, there is no need for independent 
analysis of the state's claim to jurisdiction . 
.... ----------~~----------~-------------------~ -- N.B. 
P.S. There is one point I neglected to mention above, with 
respect to the Treaty of Point Elliott. Respondents cite 
evidence that the original proposal for the treaty included 
a provision providing for federal prosecution of 
interracial crimes. This provision was the only one not 
included in the final version of the treaty. Instead, the 
only provision mentioning criminal jurisdiction provided: 
"Tribes may punish offenders of their own Tribe for any 
offesne committed, according to their own laws, ... " 
Respondents argue that this is proof that the tribe was to 
be allowed to punish non-Indians, because the provision for 
federal jurisdiction was omitted from the treaty. 
The counter-interpretation of this series of 
events is that the omitted provision was considered 
unnecessary and was omitted for that reason. This is not 
terribly persuasive~ but, on the other hand, neither is it 
reasonable to assume that an explicit treaty provision was 
thought necessary to let the tribe punish its own members, 
while its ability to punish non-Indians could be assumed 
without an explicit treaty provision. Again, the 
contemporaneous understanding is very hard to discern. 
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POST-ARGUMENT MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Jan. 10, 1978 
RE: Oliphant 
As I mentioned when we talked yesterday, I am leaning 
in the directing of saying that the tribes have concurrent 
jurisdiction with the federal government, but a only by a xlg 
slight margin. Several of my reasons are as follows: 
(1) As noted in the Wheeler memo, the double jeopardy 
exception for Indians really is not a double jeopardy exception, 
only 
\ 
because it excepts/Indians who have been punished by the tribe, 
not Indians who have been vindicated. Thus it seems likely 
that resps' interpreaation of the provision is more accurace 
than petrs: the federal government simply was not that con-
cerned about punishing an Indian who already had been punished, 
whereas it would k not want to give up its authority over 
non-Indians. This makes the failure to include non-Indians 
in the exception understandable, even on the assumption that 
they could be tried by a tribe " 
2. 
(2) Pub. L. 280 vests the states (some mandatorily, 
some voluntarily) with criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indian tribes that the states previously lacked. If the 
theory is that this state jurisdiction is exclusive of tribal 
authority (either because Congress ceded to the states its 
§ 1152 jurisdiction, which may be exl e~ exclusive, or because 
in passing Pub. L. 280 Congress meant the new state 
jurisdiction to be exclusive}, then the Indians have lost 
their civil jurisdiction as well as their criminal jurisdiction. 
If xkei is means the Indians cannot even rule tribal members, 
it clearly is wrong. Even if it means Indians cannot assert 
civil authority over non-Indians on the reservation, it 
threatens to undermine tribal self-government, recognized 
in Mazurie and Williams v. Leeo 
(3) Also with respect to Pub. L. 280: there is 
legislative history explaining that the reference to "exclusive" 
state jurisdiction in Pub. L. 280 meaKxmeRax meant exclusive 
of the federal government. When this was explained, the 
Interior Department said it did not have the reservations 
about the bill it had had previously. This may mean that 
the Intermor Department was upset about the idea of depriving 
Indians of concurrent jurisdiction. 
None of this is conclusive, but it is some evidence 
that can be added to the mix of evidence in the original memo. 
N.B. 
1/ 
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